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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case   
John Joseph Delling appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition.  
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 The procedural history of the underlying criminal case leading to Delling’s 
convictions and sentences for two counts of second degree murder was set forth 
by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows: 
 Delling was initially charged with two counts of first-degree 
murder for the deaths of David Boss and Brad Morse.  These 
counts were later amended to second-degree murder.  Shortly after 
being charged, Delling’s counsel motioned for a mental health 
evaluation to determine whether Delling was fit to proceed and able 
to aid in his own defense.  An examination was ordered by the 
district court under I.C. § 18-211.  On February 27, 2008, Delling 
was found to lack fitness to proceed, and the district court issued 
an order of commitment pursuant to I.C. § 18-212.  After nearly a 
year, the district court found that Delling’s mental state had 
improved and that he would be capable of aiding in his own 
defense. 
 
 Before trial, Delling’s counsel filed a notice of an intent to 
produce psychological evidence to show that Delling was incapable 
of forming the required mens rea.  The State responded by filing a 
motion to allow mental health experts access to Delling in order to 
conduct an evaluation under I.C. § 18-207(4)(c).  Delling objected, 
arguing that such mandated access would violate his right to 
remain silent and be free from self-incrimination. 
  
 Delling’s motion also asked the district court to declare I.C. § 
18-207, the legislative abrogation of mental condition as a defense, 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied.  More specifically, the 
motion argued that the statute violates the 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 2, 7, 
and 13 of the Idaho Constitution.  The district court denied the 
motion, holding that “[s]imply because Idaho does not recognize an 
insanity defense does not mean that mentally ill offenders are 
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deprived of any right recognized under either the United States 
Constitution or the Idaho Constitution.” 
 
 Delling agreed to enter a conditional plea of guilty to second-
degree murder, preserving the right to appeal the decision on his 
motion to declare I.C. § 18-207 unconstitutional, in both cases, in 
exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of concurrent 
sentences.  Upon pleading guilty, Delling was sentenced to 
determinate life for the second-degree murder of Brad Morse, set to 
run concurrently with his determinate life sentence for pleading 
guilty to the second-degree murder of David Boss. 
 
State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 124, 267 P.3d 709, 711 (2011).  The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed Delling’s convictions and sentences.  Delling, 151 Idaho 
122, 267 P.3d 709.  Delling filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court, which was denied.  Delling v. Idaho, 133 S.Ct. 504 
(2012). 
 On November 25, 2013, Delling filed, through appointed counsel, a timely 
petition for post-conviction relief, presenting two claims of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel.  (R., pp.3-8 (excluding exhibits), 19-20.)  On December 19, 2013, 
the state filed its State’s Response to Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Relief and 
State’s Motion to Dismiss, seeking summary dismissal of Delling’s post-
conviction petition.  (R., pp.27-32.)  Delling did not respond to the state’s motion 
to dismiss, and on February 4, 2015, the district court entered an Order Granting 
States [sic] Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  
(R., pp.35-48.)  The following day, the court entered a Judgment dismissing 
3 
Delling’s post-conviction claims with prejudice.  (R., p.49.)  Delling timely 
appealed.1  (R., pp.50-52.) 
                                            
1 The State Appellate Public Defender (“SAPD”) was originally appointed to 
represent Delling in his appeal. (R., p.55.)  The Idaho Supreme Court 
subsequently permitted the SAPD to withdraw from the case after the SAPD 
failed to identify a meritorious issue for review.  (Affidavit in Support of Motion For 
Leave to Withdraw And Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p. 2; 11/6/15 
Order Granting Motion.) 
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ISSUES 
 Delling states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the failure of the district court to provide a psychiatric 
professional to interview and observe John Delling at the 
time of the plea bargain violate John Dellings constitutional 
right of due process, equal protection, American Disabilities 
Act.  States unconstitutional act of forced medication. 
 
2. Did the Ada County Public Defenders, Alan Trimming, Gus 
Cahil [sic], fail to provide a constitutionally adequate 
representation because they failed to provide a psychiatric 
professional to conduct an [sic] psychiatric evaluation to 
refute the states third evaluation, since the first and second 
evaluations found John Delling to be incompetent, violating 
Dellings constitutional rights. 
 
3. Did the Court abuse its discreation [sic] and error, when it 
found by clear and convincing evidence that John Delling 
was competent, since John Delling had been found 
incompetent twice to stand trial, yet only competent once.  
States own record proves Dellings competency, changes by 
the hour, day, week, which would make it impossible to 
ensure of his competence at the time he signed his plea, 
violating Dellings constitutional rights.   
 
4. Did the State, Court, violate Dellings constitutional rights by 
convicting a [sic] incompetent defendant.  John Delling was 
found incompetent twice, yet the court failed to rule on the 
two incompetent, showing prejudice in ruling on the one 
competent finding.  Appellant challenges the third evaluation, 
as the state did change Dellings medication, using extremely 
heavy drugs to gain the alleged competent evaluation.  No 
toxicology on Dellings blood, the state in effect got Delling 
drunk, to gain a conviction. 
 
5. Did the State of Idaho violate John Dellings constitutional 
rights when they permited [sic], coerced, caused Delling to 
waive his right to a trial and sign a plea agreement, denied 
6th Amendment right to counsel, who is competent. 
 
6. Did the Idaho Supreme Court violate Dellings 6th 
Amendment right to counsel when they provided counsel 
who refused to visit Delling or even obtain counsel who 
would argue the Delling case before the court? 
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7. Did the Idaho Supreme Court violate John Dellings 
constitutional and federally protected rights when they failed 
to Fareta John Delling, prior to pro se. 
 
8. Did the Idaho Supreme Court violate John Dellings 
constitutional rights by hearing John Dellings case, to uphold 
Dellings conviction, when the Idaho Supreme Court Chief 
Justice, Gov. CL Otter, others, admit that Ada County Public 
Defenders provide a sub-standard, constitutionally 
inadequate defense, NLADA, ACLU, ABA, CJC etc. – 
 
9. Did the Idaho Supreme Court violate clearly established 
federal law, constitutional law, rule of law, by knowingly 
permiting [sic] a defendant that has been found incompetent 
by the state twice, to represent himself.  
 
10. Did the state violate Dellings constitutional rights when they 
knowingly failed to conduct a competency hearing 
immeadiately [sic] prior to Delling signing a plea, when he 
requested the hearing by telling his counsel just prior to 
signing and again, now before the Idaho Supreme Court 
prior to proceeding pro se.  
 
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.2-3 (capitalization modified; punctuation verbatim; 
underscore original).) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 Has Delling failed to preserve the issues raised on appeal; even if the 
summary dismissal of the claims presented in Delling’s petition is deemed 




Delling Has Failed To Preserve The Issues Raised On Appeal; Even If The 
Summary Dismissal Of The Claims Presented In Delling’s Petition Is Deemed 
Challenged On Appeal, He Has Failed To Show Error 
 
A. Introduction 
Delling contends the district court erred by granting the state’s motion to 
summarily dismiss his post-conviction petition.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief.)   
Delling’s argument fails because he failed to preserve the post-conviction claims 
he raises on appeal. Further, even if this Court determines that the claims Delling 
presented in his post-conviction petition are raised on appeal, he has failed to 
show any error in their summary dismissal.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.  Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).  On appeal from summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief.  Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999).  Appellate courts freely 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.  Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief.  Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).  However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action.  A petition must contain 
more than “a short and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for a 
complaint.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8).  
The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-
4903).  Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing.  Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).   
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own 
initiative.  “To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence raises 
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no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of petitioner’s claims.  
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.   
While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the 
court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.  
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).  If the alleged facts, even if true, would not 
entitle the petitioner to relief, the district court is not required to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition.  Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 
Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).  “Allegations contained in the 
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly 
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a 
matter of law.”  Id. 
 
D. Delling Failed To Preserve The Issues He Raises On Appeal  
 
It is well settled that issues not raised below will generally not be 
considered for the first time on appeal.  State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 888-89, 
136 P.3d 350, 359-60 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 
P.2d 123, 126 (1992).  It is also well settled “that in order for an issue to be 
raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis 
for an assignment of error.”  State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 585, 199 P.3d 
155, 160 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377, 387, 883 P.2d 1069, 
1079 (1994) (citing State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 
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(1993); Dunlick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502, 295 
P.2d 700, 702 (1956)).   
Delling presented two claims in his post-conviction petition, described by 
the district court as follows: 
In Delling’s application for post-conviction relief, he alleged two 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel 
advising Delling to enter into a plea bargain with the State in Ada 
County Case No. CR-FE-2007-0000663, which contemplated a 
resolution in Latah County Case No. CR-FE-2007-0001625.  First, 
Delling claimed he should not have been advised to plead guilty 
because the risk of the death penalty was illusory given his mental 
state, therefore he did not benefit from the plea bargain.  Instead, 
counsel should have advised Delling to take the case to trial so 
there would be a “better” record for attacking the constitutionality of 
Idaho Code §18-207.  Second, Delling claimed trial counsel should 
not have advised him to plead guilty because counsel knew Delling 
was seriously mentally ill at the time the plea was entered. 
 
(R., p.36; see R., pp.2-3.) 
Delling presents ten issues on appeal – none of which challenge the 
summary dismissal of the two post-conviction claims he presented to the district 
court.  (Compare Appellant’s Brief, pp.2-3 (see pp.4-5, supra) with R., pp.2-3, 
36.)  Because the district court did not consider any of the ten claims (or issues) 
Delling presents on appeal, he has failed to preserve them for appeal.   
It was Delling’s burden to adequately raise these claims before the district 
court and to obtain an adverse ruling.  Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 586, 199 P.3d at 
161; State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999) (quoting 
Fisher, 123 Idaho at 485, 849, P.2d at 946); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 
P.2d 27 (1988); State v. Amerson, 129 Idaho 395, 401, 925 P.2d 399, 405 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  Because the district court never addressed the post-conviction 
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claims Delling now attempts to raise on appeal, and because these claims were 
never properly before the district court to address, Delling failed to preserve 
these claims for consideration on appeal.   This Court must therefore affirm the 
district court. 
 
E. Even If The Summary Dismissal Of The Claims Presented In Delling’s 
Petition Is Deemed Challenged On Appeal, He Has Failed To Show Error 
 
Even if Delling is deemed to be challenging the summary dismissal of one 
or both of the claims presented in his post-conviction petition, has he failed to 
demonstrate any error in such dismissal.   
In granting the state’s motion to summarily dismiss Delling’s post-
conviction petition, the district court thoroughly evaluated his two claims and 
supporting evidence and correctly determined, based upon the applicable legal 
standards and underlying criminal record, that Delling failed to set forth adequate 
facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary 
hearing on any of his post-conviction claims.  (R., pp.35-48.)  The state adopts as 
its argument on appeal the district court’s analysis, as set forth in its February 4, 
2015 (filing date) Order Granting States [sic] Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  (Id.)  For this Court’s convenience, a copy of 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order summarily dismissing Delling’s post-conviction claims.   
DATED this 9th day of February, 2016. 
 
     
 /s/ John C. McKinney_______________ 
             JOHN C. McKINNEY 
         Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA TE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN JOSEPH DELLING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Case No.: CV-PC-2013-09145 
) ORDER GRANTING STA TES MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING 








This action is brought pursuant to the Unifotm Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho 
Code §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911. After considering the State's Response to Petitioner's Post-
Conviction Relief and State's Motion to Dismiss filed December 19, 2013, the Court finds 
Delling, represented by counsel, was put on notice of the deficiencies in his application for post-
conviction relief. See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 524-525, 164 P.3d 798, 804-805 
(2007). Despite ample oppo1tunity to respond to the State's motion to dismiss, Delling has not 
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. ' . ' . • • 
done so. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ J 9-4906(c), the Court having considered the application and 
the record, is satisfied that Delling is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would 
be served by any further proceedings. 
II. 
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 25, 2013, Petitioner John Delling timely filed his verified application for 
post-conviction relief. Delling is represented by counsel. In Delling's application for post-
conviction relief, he alleged two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel 
advising Delling to enter into a plea bargain with the State in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-
2007-0000663, which contemplated a resolution in Latah County Case No. CR-FE-2007-
0001625. First, Delling claimed he should not have been advised to plead guilty because the risk 
of the death penalty was illusory given his mental state, therefore he did not benefit from the plea 
bargain. Instead, counsel should have advised Delling to take the case to trial so there would be 
a "better" record for attacking the constitutionality ofldaho Code § 18-207. Second, Delling 
claimed trial counsel should not have advised him to plead guilty because counsel knew Delling 
was seriously mentally ill at the time the plea was entered. 
On December 19, 2013, the State filed its Response to Petitioner's Post-Conviction Relief 
and State's Motion to Dismiss. The State put Delling on notice that his petition only included 
bare assertions and conclusory statements, not the required admissible evidence necessary to 
support his petition for post-conviction relief. State's Motion to Dismiss at 5. The State put 
Delling on notice that he must introduce admissible evidence to suppmt both prongs of the 
2 
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Slrickland standard in order to make a primafacie claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
State's Motion to Dismiss at 3. 
The Petitioner has not supported his claims with admissible 
evidence. He has made bare assertions and conclusory statements. 
In his first claim, Delling alleges that it was ineffective assistance 
of counsel for trial counsel to advise Delling to plead guilty due to 
Delling's mental illness. Delling asserts that if the matter had gone 
to trial, he would have had the trial record to support his claim that 
Idaho's repeal of the insanity defense was unconstitutional. He 
does not claim how the trial record would have assisted him in that 
regard and he does not support his claim that he was too mentally 
ill to plead guilty. The record does show that Judge Bail 
extensively considered the question ofDelling's competence 
before accepting the plea. Since Delling does not support this 
assertion with admissible evidence, his first claim should be 
dismissed. 
Delling's second claim is a restatement of the first claim 
i.e. that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising 
Delling to plead guilty when he knew that Delling was mentally ill. 
Delling does not assert what evidence existed to prove that Delling 
was too mentally ill to plead guilty. This claim should also be 
dismissed. 
The record clearly shows that the Court found Delling to be 
competent after a hearing on the competency question. There is no 
evidence indicating Delling's guilty plea was not knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently made. 
State's Motion to Dismiss at 5. 
Delling, represented by counsel, has not responded to the State's motion. The State's 
motion to dismiss is currently before the court. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A petition for post-conviction relief commences a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding, 
3 
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which is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 
180 P.3d 476,482 (2008). See also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,724,202 P.3d 642,646 
(2008). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which 
the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 
522, 164 PJd 798,802 (2007); Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 795-796, 291 PJd 474, 478-479 
(Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Dec. 14, 2012). A petition for post-conviction relief differs 
from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, in that it must contain more than "a short 
and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under LR.C.P. 8(a)(l). State 
v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 PJd 123, 135 (2008); Schultz, 153 Idaho at 796, 291 PJd at 
479. The petition must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
petitioner, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, 
or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included. LC. § 19-4903. In other 
words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or it will be subject to dismissal. Wolfv. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67,266 P.3d 1169, 
1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
LC. § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, 
either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative, if"it appears from the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of facts, 
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." LC. § 19-4906( c ). When considering 
summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but 
the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. Payne, 146 Idaho at 
4 
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561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. Claims may be summarily 
dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal 
proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each 
essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of 
law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567,570,225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). 
IV. 
DISCUSSION 
Delling claimed his counsel was ineffective by advising him to enter into the plea bargain 
whereby the Ada County murder and Latah County murder would be consolidated, Delling 
would plead guilty to both which would result in a life sentence, while preserving his right to 
appeal the constitutionality of§ LC. 18-207. Although Delling's competence to stand trial was 
initially an issue in front of the court, substantial time and resources were spent rehabilitating 
Delling so that he was competent to stand trial. 
In Premo v. Moore,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 733, 178 L.E.2d 649, (2011), The Supreme 
Court of the United States underscored the importance of applying the Strickland standard to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context of plea bargains. "[T]he Strickland 
standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-trial inquiry' threaten the 
integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve." Id., 131 S.Ct. at 
741 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 
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The "Strickland standard" requires a petitioner, in order to make a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, to show that the attorney's performance was deficient and the petitioner 
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d at 
693-94; Se/fv. State, 145 Idaho 578,580, 181 P.3d 504,506 (Ct.App.2007). To establish a 
deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing the attorney's representation fell below an 
objective standard ofreasonableness. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,383,313 P.3d 1, 39 
(2013). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. 
In regards to the first element, deficient performance, there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance fell within the wide range of acceptable professional assistance. State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,383,247 P.3d 582,610 (2010); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 
511, 988 P .2d 1170, 1185 ( 1999). A difference of opinion regarding tactics is not proof of 
ineffective assistance of counsel because "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of 
law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Thus, the petitioner must present evidence that his attorney's tactical or 
strategic decisions were based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Stevens v. State,_ Idaho_, 327 P.3d 372, 
386, (Idaho App.2013) 
It should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the "strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." Burt v. Titlow,_, U.S._, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013) (Holding 
uncontested allegation that counsel did not retrieve file from previous defense counsel before 
advising defendant to withdraw his plea was not evidence counsel was unprepared)( citing 
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Strickland 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 
To establish Strickland prejudice is an equally difficult obstacle to overcome. A 
defendant must "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, at 694, 104 S.Ct. 
2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. Cullen v. Pinholster, U.S._,_, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557, 575 
(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698) (emphasis 
added). "To undermine corifldence in the outcome requires a 'substantial,' not just 'conceivable,' 
likelihood ofa different result." Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter,_ U.S._,_, 131 S.Ct. 
770, 791, 178 L.Ed.2d 624, 645-46 (2011)) (emphasis added). 
In the context of pleas a defendant must show that there is a substantial likelihood that he 
would not have pleaded guilty and have insisted on going to trial, but for counsel's advice. 
Pinholster, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. at 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d at 575; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
57, 106 S.Ct. 366,369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). A petitioner must do more than make the 
conclusory allegation that he would have insisted on a trial, but for the alleged error. "To obtain 
relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
372, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). See also Lafler v. Cooper, _U.S._, 
132 S.Ct. 1376, 1387,182 L.E.2d 398 (2012) ("Prejudice can be shown ifloss of the plea 
opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a 
more severe sentence.") 
Negotiating an advantageous plea bargain is an art. "Plea bargains are the result of 
complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful 
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strategic choices in balancing opportunities and risks." Premo v. Moore, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 
at 739-40. In Delling's case, the State offered to reduce the first degree murder charge to murder 
in the second degree. The State also agreed to dismiss the firearm enhancement and grand theft 
charge. Most importantly, if Delling agreed to plead guilty, he would reserve his right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the abolition of Idaho's insanity defense and J.C.§ 18-207. 
The prosecuting attorney in Latah County, where Delling was charged with the first degree 
murder of Mr. Boss, agreed to reduce the charge to murder in the second degree and run the 
sentence concurrently with this case in the event Delling plead guilty there. In Latah County, the 
defendant still faced the risk that the State would seek the death penalty. By accepting the plea 
bargain, Delling extinguished this risk. Advising Delling whether or not to accept the negotiated 
deal was a matter of strategy, balancing the opportunities and risks. With these considerations in 
mind, the Court turns to Delling's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
Delling speculates that if he had not plead guilty and gone to trial he may have had a 
better record to challenge the constitutionality of the lack of insanity defense in Idaho and I.C. § 
18-207. Thus, his counsel's advice to enter the plea deal was objectively unreasonable. 
Certainly, a particular strategy may have been to take the matter to trial and eventually attempt to 
challenge the constitutionality of the abolition of the insanity defense in Idaho. However, simply 
because post-conviction counsel would have tried the case differently than trial counsel does not 
mean that trial counsel's advice was objectively unreasonable to fulfill the performance prong of 
the Strickland test. If counsel's advice had been for Delling to reject the plea bargain, go to trial 
and appeal the matter of the insanity defense to the Supreme Court of the United States; and 
ultimately certiorari was still denied, Delling might now be arguing counsel was ineffective for 
advising him to pursue that route. 
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Delling makes the conclusory allegation that trial counsel's strategy was ineffective. In 
such cases the petitioner must come forward with evidence trial counsel was either ignorant of 
relevant law or unprepared. He has not. To the contrary, the record reflects trial counsel was 
well versed in the constitutionality of the insanity defense on a national scale. Memorandum 
(filed April !, 2009). Furthermore, the record reflects trial counsel was intimately 
knowledgeable about the minute details ofDelling's case. Delling's competence had been 
extensively evaluated and rehabilitated. Petitioner's Exhibit A, a portion of the transcript 
discussing Delling's mental state, does not create a material issue of fact. After the Court found 
Delling competent to stand trial, the court specifically recognized Delling had a chronic mental 
illness, but found that with treatment and medication he was able to understand the significance 
of the legal proceedings and meaningfully assist in his defense. Trial counsel competently 
responded to the State's motion to introduce I.R. E. 404(b) evidence. Finally, trial counsel 
pursued a motion to suppress statements given to police after Delling was initially arrested. 
Delling has not come forward with any salient facts trial counsel should have known or any 
objective evidence counsel was unprepared. Simply speculating that Delling would not have 
received the death penalty, therefore he had nothing to lose by going to trial is not objective 
evidence counsel was unprepared or ignorant of relevant law. 
After a defendant is subjected to the cold, hard realities of life in prison he most certainly 
questions, "What if ... ?" However, to make a claim for post-conviction relief requires the 
petitioner to present admissible evidence that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective level 
of competence. The State has pointed out this glaring deficiency in Delling's petition, yet 
Delling has failed to come forward with evidence to support his claim. As such, his first claim 
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that he would have a better record to appeal Idaho's abolition of the insanity defense is 
dismissed. 
Second, Delling argued his attorney knew Delling was incompetent to enter his guilty 
plea, yet advised him to enter it anyway. To support his claim, Delling offers the verified 
statement in his petition, "Trial counsel had reservations about his client's ability to assist him 
with strategy," to support his position that counsel knew he was incompetent to proceed to enter 
his guilty plea. It is unclear how petitioner has knowledge that trial counsel had reservations, 
however, even assuming Delling believed he acted in a way that should have given trial counsel 
reservations, Delling fails to create a material issue of fact. The record contradicts Delling's 
allegation. While it is true that the Court accepts as true petitioner's claims, the Court does not 
accept petitioner's claims that are contradicted by the record. 
There are three instances in which the record directly contradicts Petitioner's claim that 
counsel advised him to plead guilty although counsel knew Delling was incompetent to enter his 
guilty plea. 
First, in the underlying criminal case, there is an extensive portion of the record devoted 
exclusively to whether Delling was competent to stand trial. The court ordered a competency 
evaluation to be performed per J.C.§ 18-211 in February of 2008. Delling was committed to the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare where he received treatment with the goal of 
establishing his ability to understand the nature of the legal proceedings and meaningfully assist 
in his defense. It was necessary to extend the commitment, and roughly one year later, on 
February 19, 2009, the Court found him competent to proceed. In the Court's findings of facts to 
support its competency determination, the Court found that although Delling suffered from a 
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significance of the legal proceedings, his rights and defenses and Delling was able to assist his 
legal team in his defense. Delling was competent to proceed as long as he continued taking his 
medications and participating in treatment. Delling has not introduced any evidence to suggest 
he was not medicated or participating in treatment when he entered the plea bargain. 
Second, the record of the guilty plea hearing for Case No. CR FE-2007-663 contradicts 
Delling's claim that counsel believed Delling was not competent to enter his plea. The Court 
specifically inquired of trial counsel whether he had any reservations with Delling proceeding to 
enter his guilty plea. During the plea colloquy the following exchange occurred: 
The Court: Have you been able to meet with your client and 
advise him fully as to his rights and defenses? 
[Trial Counsel]: I have, Judge. 
The Court: Did you talk to him about the consequences of 
pleading guilty? 
[Trial Counsel]: Yes, ma'am, I have. 
THE COURT: Are there any problems with him entering a 
guilty plea today, as far as you are aware? 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: No, ma'am, there is not, Judge. 
THE COURT: Has he had any difficulty understanding what you 
have advised him about his rights and defenses? 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Judge, to my knowledge, he has not. 
Tr. 308:6-21 (emphasis added). 
Finally, the record contradicts that counsel was concerned about Delling's mental state 
when he entered a guilty plea to the murder charge in CR FE-2007-1625, on August 3, 2009. 
After Delling entered the plea in the Ada County case, the Latah County murder case was 
transferred to Ada County and charged as murder in the second degree. Delling was arraigned 
and entered a plea of guilty on August 3, 2009. Prior to Delling entering his plea, trial counsel 





The Court: Have you reviewed this case with your client? 
[Trial Counsel]: We have, Judge. 
The Court: Have you advised him fully of his rights and defenses? 
[Trial Counsel]: Yes, ma'am, we have. 
The Court: Is he aware of the consequences of pleading guilty? 
Trial Counsel: He is, Your Honor. 
The Court: Is there any reason at all why we should not 
proceed at this time 
Trial Counsel: No, Your Honor, none known to him. 
Tr. 573: 14-25, 574: I. 
The record shows Delling was competent after February 19, 2009. There is no indication 
Delling did not understand the magnitude of the judicial proceedings or was unable to assist his 
trial counsel with his defense. Furthermore, the record shows that Delling's attorney did not 
harbor reservations about Delling's competence. The only evidence to support that Delling's 
attorney believed Delling was incompetent to proceed is the lone verified statement that his 
attorney had "reservations" about his ability to assist with the defense. Petitioner's allegations 
which are contradicted by the record do not create a material issue of fact. When viewed against 
the record, Delling's verified statement does not create a material issue of fact as to whether trial 
counsel had reservations about Delling's competence. Thus, Delling has failed to make a prima 










It appears from the record there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Notice of the reasons for summary dismissal were 
succinctly stated by the State in the State's Response to Petitioner's Post-Conviction Relief and 
State's Motion to Dismiss filed December 19, 2013. Where the dismissal is based upon the 
grounds offered by the State, additional notice is unnecessary. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 
236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). When a trial court summarily dismisses an application for post-
conviction relief based in part on the arguments presented by the State, this is sufficient to meet 
the notice requirements. Id. The State has put Delling on notice that both claims are not 
supported by admissible evidence, rather are bare and conclusory statements, contradicted by the 
record. Delling has had ample time to respond and has not. Delling has failed to offer 
admissible evidence to establish the performance prong of the Strickland test. Thus, Delling has 
not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c ), this Court hereby GRANTS 
the State's motion to dismiss. Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief is DISMISSED. 
It is so ordeM, 
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